This work examines cognitive flexibility using a comparative approach. Pigeons (Experiment 1), human children (Experiment 2a), and human adults (Experiment 2b) performed a task that required changing responses to the same stimuli twice across the experiment. The results indicate that all three groups demonstrated robust memory for learned information. In addition, pigeons showed comparable and substantial perseveration following both response shifts. In contrast, both children and adults exhibited some perseveration following a first response shift, while exhibiting no cost following the second response shift. These findings are discussed in relation to memory-based theories of cognitive flexibility, according to which perseveration occurs as a result of competition between long-term and working memory, revealing important differences in memory and cognitive flexibility between species.
Introduction
Cognitive flexibility is an important aspect of executive function that may be defined as the ability to efficiently adapt to changing task demands. As the environment, needs, and goals change frequently for both non-human animals and humans, cognitive flexibility is often critical for survival. The current work examines one form of cognitive flexibility -changing responses to the same stimuli -using a comparative approach. Specifically, we examined the role of memory in this process in pigeons as well as human children and adults.
One aspect of cognitive flexibility is responding differently to the same stimuli, depending on the current situation. For example, the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Berg, 1948) provides a measure of cognitive flexibility by requiring participants to learn to sort cards by different dimensions (i.e., shape, color, or number) based on feedback. Crucially, the sorting rule periodically changes without warning, such that participants must learn to switch responses to the same stimuli based on shifting rules. This task is commonly used as a clinical measure of frontal lobe functioning; patients with frontal lobe damage have greater difficulty shifting between sorting rules (Robinson, Heaton, Lehman, & Stilson, 1980) .
Variants of this task are commonly used to investigate the development of flexibility. For example, in the Dimension Change Card Sort (DCCS) task, young children are asked to sort cards according to shape or color (Zelazo, 2006) . After a number of trials of sorting cards according to one dimension, children are told to shift and sort by the other dimension. Three-year-old children have substantial difficulty shifting to the second dimension; they perseverate by continuing to sort by the prior dimension (Zelazo et al., 2003) . Five-year-olds, in contrast, succeed at shifting to the new rule in the standard task, but struggle in an advanced version of the task, in which they are required to shift between sorting rules on a trial-by-trial basis conditional on a contextual cue, such as the color of a border surrounding the object (Hongwanishkul, Happaney, Lee, & Zelazo, 2005) .
Why does perseveration occur? And what factors account for developmental change? One account stipulates that perseveration occurs due to "attentional inertia" (Kirkham, Cruess, & Diamond, 2003) . According to this theory, participants learn to attend to a particular aspect of stimuli, such as shape; perseveration happens when the contingencies change and participants struggle to inhibit the now-irrelevant dimension and shift attention to another, now-relevant dimension. Hence, the primary locus of developmental change is inhibition of established attentional patterns.
An alternative account (Morton & Munakata, 2002) stipulates that perseveration occurs due to competition between latent (or long-term) memory and active (or working) memory. Specifically, participants first learn (over multiple repetitions) a given contingency, which eventually becomes part of their long-term memory. Then, after the shift, the contingencies change, yet the stimuli do not. As a result, these old stimuli re-activate the learned contingencies in long-term memory, thus triggering the learned response. At the same time, the new contingency has to be actively maintained in working memory. This co-existence of 
